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DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT

Controlles Constitute Island Supposed of responsibility and recommendation by softer to present repetition)

shours and leaded with eight (8) 500 lb CaP. bombe and two (2) 500 lb liery beabs. (Motake-off the airplane acted normally to all witnesses until apprecimetely two-thirds of the way down the 8500 ft runway. At this point although mearly airborne the power was reduced and one application of the brakes was made. Plane were dropped to the full down position and the nose wheel lifted clear off the ground as though in an attempt to increase the drag. This action at such high speed caused the lift to momentarily increase resulting in the left main wheels losing contact with the ground for a short distance. About 1200 ft from the end of the runway the brakes were again applied and apparently kept on. The airplane was slowed down to an estimated 40 MPH by the time the end of the runway was recebed. No attempt was made to turn onto the taxiway, which could have been accomplished successfully. The airplane ran off the end of the runway and down a slope (this down grade estimated at 2%). A mound of dirt and coral approximately ten feet high and seventy feet long was hit. As the aircraft went up this mound it broke in two, fell on the far side and immediately exploded. There were no survivors. One bystander, approximately five to seven hundred feet away was killed by flying debris. The aircraft was so empletely demelished that investigation to determine may reason why the Airplane Commander decided to stop his take-off roll was impossible. No reason can be afforded for failure of the airplane commander to turn the airplane onto the taxiway at the end of the runway.

Responsibility: UNDETERMINED 100%

GEORY A. COOK
In jer, Mr Corps
Member

Dean C. Tehneger DEAN GLIFFORD FOREURGER

Cept, Air Corps Member

ENARD T. SCOTT

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Board Proceedings

2. Photographs

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DATE 12 Feb 45

Signature (Investigating Officer)

. S. Opposition Palatine Wylet

HEADQUARTERS 313TH BOMBARDMENT WING APO #247. c/o Postmaster Sen Francisco, California

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127ebruary 1945

PROCEEDINGS OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION BOARD FOR ACCIDENTS

The Board convened on 12 Pebruary 1945 at Provisional Army Air Base #2, APO #247, pursuant to Special Order No. 14, paragraph 2, as amended by Special Order No. 25, paragraph 4, this headquarters, for the purpose of examining vitnesses and determining cause of the aircraft accident involving B-29 airplane #42-65255.

First Witness, MAJOR VERMON BOCCCE, 505th Bombardment Group, Op Engineering O.

MAJ COOK: Major Bocock, you saw the attempted take-off of airplane #2-65295 on the morning of 10 February 1945. Will you give the board your observations?

MAJ BOCCCK: I was standing mid-way between runway #1 and runway #3 on the east taxiway. I was watching the take-offs of all the planes. First, I noticed the airplane was when it came into view at the end of the runway. I estimate the speed of the plane at approximately 35 miles per hour. The brakes of the plane were on. I could tell by the way the dust was souffing up behind the wheels. The plane headed directly toward the end of the runway and seemed to slow down somewhat. Then it went off the runway over an incline and hit an embankment approximately 500 feet away. When it hit, the plane broke in two, folded up and fell over on the opposite side. The moment it fell the bombs exploded.

MAJ COOK: Could you judge about where the fuselage broke in two?

MAJ BOCCCE: Right aft of the Wing, about ten feet.

MAJ COOK: Do you believe the plane hit the mound of earth at same speed it left the runway?

MAJ BOCOCK: It had only slowed down a little. It probably hit at about 25 miles per hour.

LT SCOTT: Did you notice if the wheels were in a down position (I wean as though they were holding back and the plane was straining forward?)

MAJ BOCOCK: Yes, I believe they were.

MAJ COOK: Have you any comments on maintenance problems encountered with this plane?

MAJ BOCOCK: No comments.

LT SCOTT: Did you notice any manipulations of the throttle?

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MAJ BOCOCK: No. they seemed to be all the way back the whole time.

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Proceedings of Aircraft Accident Investigation Board of 12 Feb hs.

MAJ COOK: Had the plane made any provious missions?

MAJ BOCOCK: I don't know.

MAJ COOK: Since you were standing on the eastern taxiway, can you estimate how many vehicles were there and what type?

MAJ BOCOCK: I would say there were shout 10 in the vicinity on both sides of the taxinay — jeeps and $6 \times 6^4 s$.

Second Witness, If. J. R. BUCKLEY, 505th Rombardment Group, Ordnance Officer.

MAJ COOK: You are the Group Ordnance Officer of the 505th Bombardment Group, Lt. Buckley. Will you give the board the bomb load of airplane #42-65255.

LT BUCKLEY: Bight (6) Composition B General Purpose Bombs, (500 lb). Two (2) M76 Incendiary Bombs (500 lb)

MAJ COOK: Were these bombs armed?

LT BUCKLEY: He they were not.

MAJ COOK: One you give a feasible reason as to may they detonated?

LT BUCKLEY: My personal opinion is that the gasoline exploded first and set off the bembs. When the explosion occurred I was standing three-quarters of the way down the runway.

MAJ COOK: Could 500 lb CP bombs be detonated as a result of damage to the fuse?

LT BUCKLEY: Only if the vane cap of the nose fuse is off. It is possible for this cap to be broken off by a glancing blow. When this happens, the fuse is armed. Then a blow on the striker would detonate the bomb.

MAJ COOK: Did you find any bomb shackles?

LT BUCKLEY: No, I don't believe one was found.

MAJ COOK: Could the lifting force of the plane crash tear off the bombs?

LT BUCKLEY: It might. However, the bombs have a spring arrangement on the bomb rack. I would not know just how much of a jar it would take to shake the bembs loose. The shackle could be broken, however, as it is constructed to withstand a maximum force of only 1600 lbs.

MAJ COCK: From your position, did you notice any difficulties the pilot was having as he passed you?

If BUCKLEY: I noticed that the throttle was cut back just before reaching the last part of the runway.

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MAJ COOK: Did the pilot use his brakes?

LT BUCKLEY: I would say he did not appear to be using his brakes.

LT SCOTT: Did you notice if he tried to use his emergency brake?

LT BUCKLEY: No. As he reached the end of the runway he seemed to pull the end of the mose up.

MAJ COOK: Did he put more flaps down?

LT BUCKLEY: I did not motice.

CAPT MRIGS: Did he seem to be having any engine trouble?

LT BUCKLEY: I didn't notice any trouble he might be having.

MAJOR COOK: Could you see the pilot?

If BUCKLEY: No, I did not see him.

Third Witness, CAPT F. H. FITEGERALD, 463d Bombardment Sq. Engineering Officer

MAJ COOK: As Squadron Engineering Officer will you give us some comments on the maintenance difficulties that were encountered with the airplane which might have consed this accident?

CAPT FITZGERALD: The airplene was one of our best. We had no particular problems with it. Main problem was a burned out landing gear motor. One instrument had to be changed — a temperature indicator. The ship aborted once due to the propeller governors. New prop governors with modified clips were installed in it. This ship was on the Kobe strike. Each of the 4 engines had 90.25 hours on them. A fuel pressure signal and defroster motor had to be replaced. We worried quite a bit about the fuel consumption on this plane. It required more power to keep up with other planes. The gress weight of the plane at take-off was 133,000 lbs. Low nose oil pressure on #2 engine was noticed by crew chief. Grew chief and instrument specialist bled the lines and pressure was brought back up to normal.

MAJ COOK: What was Form 1A status of the plane?

CAPT FITZGERALD: It was on red diagonal for cracked running light glass and the drift meter was precessing slightly. We had it on emergency requisition.

MAJ COOK: Was it the first time you had had trouble with mose oil pressure?

CAPT FITZGERALD: Yes, it was the first trouble we had.

MAJ COOK: When was the ship last flown prior to the date of accident?

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CAPT FITZGERALD: Kobe mission, approximately 4 days before. Since that mission the ship had equivalent to 100-hour inspection minus plug change, refraction test and valve check.

Fourth Witness, T/SOT GEORGE WACKES, Crew Chief, 453d Squadron

MAJ COOK: As Grew Chief of the plane in question, I would like to have you give us some information on recent maintenance on the ship.

sor WACEEs: The plane had flown a mission 5 days prior to the accident and had had the regular between mission inspection, which is the regular 100-hour inspection misses plug change, refraction test and valve check.

MAJOR COOK: As a result of between mission imspection were there any major maintenance problems?

SOT MACKES: No. sir. Just prior to this take-off the mose oil pressure gave a low indication so we had to bleed the line. After the line was bled the pressure was checked and found to be okey.

MAJ CCCK: Had all 4 propeller governors received modified resistor clips?

SGT WACKES: Yes, they all had the modified clips.

MAJ COCK: What was the Form 1A status of the ship?

SOT WACKES: Red diagonal. Drift meter needed constant caging. A glass was also cracked on one running light.

MAJ COCK: In making between-mission check, was 100-hour inspection work sheet used?

SOF WACKES: Yes, this form was used. It was in the Form lA and probably burned with the ship.

MAJ COOK: May I see the Form #41B?

SOT WACKES: Yes, sir.

MAJ COOK: Can you give me the gas load of the ship?

SOT WACKES: Approximately 7500 gallons.

MAJ COOK: The form shows excessive heating on #2 engine.

SOT WACKES: Yes, that was two flights ago. We changed carbureter and set it down. I checked installation and found it satisfactory.

MAJ COOK: I cen't find any reports in the 41B that would have any bearing on

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MAJ COCK: Sgt Wackes, did you check the Form "F" and can you give us the takeoff weight of the ship?

SOT WACKES: 132,365 pounds was the total gross weight.

MAJ COOK: You had contact with the pilot just before take-off time. Would you have noticed anything about his physical and mental condition?

SOT WACKES: Physically he was alright, but he seemed worried about the gasoline lead. The Flight Engineer was also worried. They were of the opinion that the mission could not be completed with the fuel supply given them.

MAJ COOK: Did they mention gas consumption to you that morning?

SOT WACKES: They checked the tanks and seemed nervous about it.

Fifth Witness, PFC M C LAWRENCE, ASH 37567186, MP

MAJOR COOK: You were an MP on duty on the airdrone at the time of the socident, were you met?

PVT LAWRENCE: You, sir.

MAJ COOK: No you remember approximately where you were standing when the accedent occurred?

PVT LATERICE: I was standing at the intersection of runway #1 and the east taxi strip.

MAJ COOK: Will you give me a brief description of what you saw?

PVT LAWRINGE: As the plane approached me up the runway it seemed to swerve to the left. The pilot seemed to be trying to slow the ship down. I thought he was trying to turn on to either of the taxi strips, instead he went right off the runway, hit a mound of dirt, broke in two shd fell over the top. I would say he was going about 40 miles an hour.

MAJ COOK: Were you able to see the pilot?

PVT LAWRENCE: I didn't notice the pilot. I saw the man in the left side blister. I heard three series of explosions in rapid succession.

MAJ COOK: Were there any vehicles parked on taxiway?

PVT LAWRENCE: Yes, sir, there were four trucks on side of the taxiway leading to Service Center "C" and four trucks on the taxiway leading the other way. I also believe there were two jeeps and several weapons carriers on the east 337

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MAJ COOK: Did you have instructions to keep vehicles off runways?

PVT LAWRENCE: My only instructions were to stop vehicles from crossing renway during take-off.

Sixth Witness, PFC R L HAMMON, A5A 34652232. MP

MAJ COOK: You were an MP on daty on the taxiway at the time the accident occurred, were you not?

PYT HARMON: Yes, sir.

MAJ COOK: Do you remember where you were standing?

PVT HARMON: I was standing in the middle of the taxistrip, stopping traffic from crossing renway.

MAJ COOK: How many vehicles did you see on taxiway?

PVT HARMON: I don't remember seeing any vehicles on the taxiway. There were some on the side of the taxiway, however. There was an oil truck, I remember.

MAJ COOK: Will you please outline just what you saw?

PYT HARMON: I was watching the plane come toward me. The front wheels were off the ground, but it seemed the pilot was trying to slow the plane down. Finally the wheels come back down, and the pilet was still trying to stop the ship. I noticed that the flaps were down.

MAJ COOK: Did you notice if the flaps were down more than they would be on an average take-off?

PYT HAMMON: I didn't notice that.

MAJ COOK: How fast do you estimate the plane was traveling?

PYT HARMON: Between 40 and 50 miles per hour.

MAJ COOK: Would you say the pilot attempted to turn the plane off on to the taximay?

PYT HARMON: No, I don't think he did.

CHORGE S. COOK

Major, AC

Senior Member Aircraft Accident Investigation Board

